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In pathological fear and anxiety, there are numerous examples of erroneous threat-related 
information processing. Among these are the social phobic’s interpretation of the other 
person’s encouraging smile as mockery; the spider phobic’s unrealistic expectancy of 
encountering spiders and being attacked by these little animals; the obsessive-compulsive 
individual’s incapacity to direct his or her attention away from supposedly contaminated 
objects; and the traumatized person’s selective memory of disturbance-eliciting life events.  
Processing biases are a hallmark of anxiety disorders. Pathological fear and anxiety 
are thought to be maintained by abnormal distribution of attention to external stimuli, atypical 
interpretation of situations, biased expectancy of events, and abnormalities in memory (e.g., 
Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997). While pathological fear and anxiety are thought to 
be provoked or consolidated by such threat-related biases (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006; 
Taylor & Rachman, 1994), these biases can, under certain circumstances, also be observed 
in healthy individuals (e.g., Amin & Lovibond, 1997; Davey, 1992; Öhman, Flyket, & Esteves, 
2001). Threat-related cognitive biases may evoke powerful affective responses that are 
characterized by increased physiological arousal, inhibition of ongoing activities, and a 
change in individual priorities. Ideally, these responses are adaptive in the sense that they 
permit an individual to overcome obstacles and to accomplish the best possible outcome in a 
threatening situation (as is the case in healthy individuals). However, sometimes such fear 
and anxiety are inappropriate given the situation and, instead of enhancing life quality, they 
prevent individuals from living well and actively pursuing important goals. Rather than helping 
individuals to actively cope with a threatening situation, (sub)clinical types of fear and anxiety 
are thus maladaptive and restrictive. The delineation of neurocognitive and 
psychophysiological determinants and associations of such biases in fear and anxiety is 
therefore of high theoretical and societal interest. 
Recent attempts have been made to understand the psychophysiological 
mechanisms underlying threat-related biases and the possible links between these biases 
(Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Hirsch et al., 2006; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997). Understanding the neurophysiological and cognitive basis of different processing 
biases and the possible causal links between them is of fundamental theoretical importance. 
In the long run, such understanding will further pave the way to more effective neurocognitive 
treatments. 
 The aim of the current special issue is to provide a comprehensive survey of cutting-
edge interdisciplinary investigations of processing biases in health and in anxiety disorders. 
The special issue includes original research papers, reviews, and theoretical opinion papers, 
all aimed at understanding the mechanisms subserving threat-related cognitive biases and 
possible shared processes between them. Contributions in this special issue describe 
research with different populations (healthy; those with phobia, general anxiety disorder, and 
subclinical anxiety) and methods (behavioral investigations, imaging studies, 
electroencephalography, and psychophysiology). The importance of individual differences 
(e.g., in trait anxiety, intolerance of uncertainty, worry, or neuroticism) with respect to threat-
related processing biases is also discussed.  
 Following the official advertising and our invitation to contribute to the special issue’s 
topic, we received a surprisingly high number of excellent papers and therefore decided to 
group them into two issues instead of a single special issue. The first special issue considers 
neurocognitive mechanisms modulating attention bias in anxiety (link to the other special 
issue). In this second special issue, we focus on (a) other forms of cognitive bias, to date 
understudied compared with attention biases, and (b) interactions between different types of 
cognitive bias. 
 
1. Consideration of single cognitive biases 
The special issue opens with a detailed neurocognitive examination of a posteriori 
covariation bias, a specific form of memory bias that describes the overassociation of specific 
events with specific outcomes. For instance, humans, phobic individuals in particular, have 
been shown to retrospectively overestimate the likelihood that fear-related stimuli were 
followed by a negative experience (e.g., de Jong & Merckelbach, 1991; Pury & Mineka, 
1997). Here, Wiemer and Pauli (2016) showcase an ingenious study on spider phobia that 
identified functional connectivity patterns characteristic of increases or decreases in such an 
a posteriori covariation bias. Their results point to the fundamental role of communication 
between sensorimotor and visual areas for this kind of cognitive bias to arise. 
 Highly fearful and phobic individuals display not only well-known biases related to 
memory, attention, interpretation, and expectancies, but also significant perceptual 
distortions that may manifest as a size bias that, to date, has only rarely been studied. An 
interesting study by Leibovich, Cohen, and Henik (2016) showed that highly spider-fearful 
participants, in contrast to controls, present a size bias for spiders. Moreover, this size bias is 
influenced by both valence and self-relevance. Shiban et al.’s (2016) report relates to these 
observations by describing a significant reduction of size bias in spider phobia in response to 
a promising treatment involving exposure to virtual reality.  
The mere exposure effect, an evaluative bias reflecting increased liking of repeatedly 
presented subliminal neutral stimuli (Zajonc, 2001), may also be of relevance for the 
investigation of the processing of threat-related information. While most research in the area 
has been conducted with neutral stimuli and/or healthy populations, Rinck and Becker (2016) 
present interesting data delineating how the mere exposure effect may be neutralized or 
even reversed in highly spider-fearful individuals who are confronted with spider pictures.  
 
2. Consideration of causal influences between different cognitive biases 
Recently, attention has been drawn to the fact that cognitive biases in clinical fear and 
anxiety may interact and that they only seldom operate in isolation (Aue & Okon-Singer, 
2015; Hirsch et al., 2006; Williams et al., 1997). Sussman, Jin, and Mohanty (2016) provide 
an excellent review of top-down and bottom-up influences in threat-related perception and 
attention in anxiety. Their work stresses that top-down factors such as goals, prior 
knowledge, or expectancy have for too long been disregarded in research on attention 
deployment to and perceptual processing of threat, and that these factors deserve further 
investigation.  
In order to determine causal influences of one bias on the other, one needs to 
experimentally manipulate one cognitive process and examine its influence on the other. 
Accordingly, the idea that biased prior expectancies might be responsible for deviations in 
attention deployment in phobia has been tested by Aue, Chauvigné, Bristle, Okon-Singer, 
and Guex (2016). Replicating an earlier behavioral finding (Aue, Guex, Chauvigné, & Okon-
Singer, 2013) of missing evidence for expectancy influences on early orienting of attention – 
both in phobics and in non-fearful controls – our behavioral and psychophysiological (heart 
rate, pupil diameter, and respiration rate) data speak to the existence of specific threat 
detection mechanisms that are only minimally permeable to (experimentally manipulated) 
prior expectancies.  
Another way to experimentally induce expectancies relies on changing memory 
traces via fear conditioning (and extinction) procedures, which thus refers to causal 
influences of memory processes on threat-related expectancies. Morriss, Christakou, and 
van Reekum (2016) present compelling skin conductance data suggesting that biased 
expectancies in fear extinction (i.e., expectancies that are overly resistant to fear extinction) 
may be the result of high intolerance of uncertainty.  
Memory processes can also be related to attention deployment. Münch, Westermann, 
Pizzagalli, Hofmann, and Müller (2016) investigated the electrophysiological correlates of 
early visual processing of conditional stimuli, human faces, after fear conditioning and after 
extinction. In their original research, the authors additionally introduced top-down instructions 
in order to vary the degree of self-relevance of the conditional stimuli and investigated 
whether this type of top-down contextual information can successfully modulate fear 
conditioning effects. Attention, as indexed by early brain responses, was particularly 
sensitive to self-relevant, non-extinguished conditional stimuli. Apart from showing memory 
influences on attention deployment in a more general sense, these results thus underscore 
the importance of the significance of the to-be-encoded material when building memory 
traces. The causal impact of another memory process on attention deployment is nicely 
illustrated in Sari, Koster, Pourtois, and Derakshan’s (2016) study that showed convincing 
effects of working memory training on attentional control (and levels of trait anxiety) by the 
use of behavioral and electrophysiological (resting state EEG) measures. 
However, fear-relevant biases in attention may not only be affected by specific 
memory processes; the reverse causal influence is also imaginable. Indeed, using skin 
conductance, Hur, Iordan, Berenbaum, and Dolcos (2016) provide strong evidence for the 
determinative character of an individual’s focus of attention on the establishment of memory 
traces in fear conditioning. Their study additionally examined the influence of neuroticism, 
cognitive load, and contingency awareness on conditioning. Among other things, the authors 
found the impact of attentional focus to be most prominent in individuals characterized by 
both high neuroticism and high contingency awareness. 
The special issue concludes with reflections on phenomena that, though related to 
anxiety disorders, may be worth being considered apart from them. Hezel and McNally 
(2016) review cognitive biases (in attention, interpretation, and memory) and other cognitive 
deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder, and Davey and Meeten (2016) evaluate the role of 
these and other cognitive biases in perseverative worry bouts. The authors further point to 
similarities and divergences of cognitive peculiarities in obsessive compulsive disorders and 
pathological worry on the one hand and different types of anxiety disorders on the other. It 
becomes evident that some characteristics might be transdiagnostic in nature, while others 
are more specific to a particular disorder. Notably, both papers close with hypotheses about 
the associations between cognitive biases and discuss causal influences that need to be 
tested in future research. In addition, both groups of authors point to the lack of 
neurophysiological investigations regarding cognitive distortions related to their topic of 
choice. Undoubtedly, further studies are needed to identify general versus disorder-specific 
neurocognitive mechanisms underlying different forms of cognitive bias and their interplay. 
In sum, this unique collection of papers delineates promising and intriguing research 
avenues. We hope that the special issue may inspire new exciting research projects that will 
further our understanding of the neurophysiological and cognitive mechanisms implicated in 
threat-related information processing – in health as in disease.  
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